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TS # 142113

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9 JUN 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: General H. F. Twining
Chairman, Net Evaluation Subcommittee

SUBJECT: 1961 Net Evaluation

1. I have reviewed the Basic Assumptions for the 1961 Net Evaluation as set forth in your memorandum of 17 May. I agree upon the desirability of studying a general nuclear war initiated by the USSR in a period of heightened world tension.

2. The Basic Assumptions note that the US will receive only that tactical warning provided by warning devices. I presume that the Staff considers the condition of "heightened world tension" to constitute some type of strategic warning. It appears to me that it would be helpful in setting up the problem to define more precisely the extent of strategic warning and the nature of the US reaction to it. For example, in a situation of heightened tension, there may or may not be--depending upon the cause of the tension--advance preparations on the Soviet side. Obviously, the degree of preparation on the Soviet side and the amount of time available for such steps as packing missiles would affect the weight and effectiveness of any Soviet attack. Similarly, the assumed extent of US preparations in a period of tension would affect both the damage to the US and the weight of the retaliatory attack. It might be desirable, therefore, to spell out the precise degree of US alert.

3. I am concerned that these important assumptions be as realistic as possible, though all of us recognize, I am sure, that we cannot postulate correctly all the conditions under which an attack might occur. The problems I have noted in paragraph two are problems which I presume the

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Staff will resolve in the course of its deliberations. However, the manner in which they are resolved will greatly affect the outcome of the analysis. In these circumstances, it might be desirable for the Subcommittee to examine the more detailed assumptions which the Staff will prepare as the study gets under way.

SIGNED

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

ONE, [] : 8 June 60

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